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COPY NO. 25

27 March 1953

MEMORANDUM

To: 25X1A [REDACTED]
From: [REDACTED]
Subject: Malenkov Test Case

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1. The major points in this report were transmitted orally to you, [REDACTED] during January and February. The most important finding was that there was not enough primary data on Malenkov to warrant a detailed psychological analysis of his life. But as a result of my search for data I have come across suggestions related to this type of approach, as well as some ideas in respect to Malenkov himself, which might interest members of FSB and perhaps others in the government who are working on similar problems. To such persons this report may be of some value.

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2. I have not incorporated observations and information available since the death of Stalin. In a luncheon conversation with [REDACTED] of the Soviet Internal Branch of OIR, I learned that a number of studies on Malenkov have been produced by that Branch since the death of Stalin. No doubt other government agencies have also been busy on the same topic. My own opinions concerning Malenkov's personality were reflected in a memo entitled "Malenkov," dated 3 March 53, and certain suggestions concerning the desirability of destroying a build-up of his hero image were jotted down in another memo entitled "Theme re Malenkov," dated 10 March 53.

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PSB:R/ [REDACTED]
3/27/53

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26 March 53

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MEMORANDUM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: Malenkov Test Case

REFERENCES: (a) PSB D-24, dated 1 Nov. 52, entitled Program of Psychological Preparation for Stalin's Passing from Power.

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(b) Memo from [REDACTED] dated 4 Dec. 52, entitled Psychological Analysis of Politburo Leaders: Test Case.

Statement of the Problem:

In PSB D-24 it is stated that the "Ways of enhancing top-level conflicts in a useful manner before Stalin's passing should be continuously studied, developed if promising, and employed when considered feasible and desirable by the members of PSB. This task should envisage not only conflicts as such but also those contributory factors which might eventually shape events in directions favorable to U. S. interests. Particular emphasis should be put upon exploring the possibility of developing psychological operations aimed at influencing the minds of top-level Soviet leaders in such a manner as to enhance decisively present or potential conflicts among them."

This paragraph has created interest in the possibility of making detailed psychological analysis of important Soviet leaders, especially members of the Presidium. The classic psycho-political analysis in World War II was made by Prof. William Langer and Prof. Henry Murray of Harvard in which they predicted that in the face of defeat Hitler would most likely commit suicide. This prediction proved useful to the intelligence community, since they were able to set in motion forces that at least partially destroyed the Nazi image which Hitler wanted to leave behind him. Is it possible to produce comparable psycho-political analyses of Soviet leaders?

Langer and Murray had available to them tremendous resources of psychological data, many primary sources: persons who had lived,

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worked, played, and even engaged in sexual intimacies, with Hitler. Without primary source materials psychological studies are of dubious validity. Do we have enough primary source materials on members of the Presidium to make it worth while to undertake such a study?

As the result of discussions of this problem with representatives from the supporting agencies of PSB it was recommended that, on the basis of a test case, we decide if at present it is feasible and practical to carry out a detailed psychological analysis. Since Malenkov, during the last few years, has been frequently mentioned as the most likely successor to Stalin, it was decided to make him the test case, and the Deputy Director of PSB authorized a search by the undersigned of information and intelligence on Malenkov available in State, Defense, and CIA.*

Searching for Data:

Three general methods were used in searching for information on Malenkov:

- (a) Talking with persons who were knowledgeable about the Presidium or Malenkov for facts, opinions, and clues;
- (b) Screening or reading currently available non-classified literature on Malenkov; and
- (c) Consulting files on Malenkov available in government agencies.

Government Files on Malenkov:

The government files which were consulted on Malenkov were as follows:

Department of the Army:

- (a) The Eurasian Branch of G-2 has two relevant files, both of which were consulted on 12 January. One file deals with the Politburo and the other with Malenkov. Norman Eliasson, who made the files available to me, said they had been maintained by Mr. Y. J. Skalnik for the use of General Weckerling when he was Deputy G-2. Mr. Skalnik was at the time away on active duty. Eliasson suggested that there might be valuable information on Malenkov and

* Morgan memo 4 Dec. 52

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others who had negotiated with the Russians and worked on missions in the Soviet Union between 1941 and 1946. The Navy and Air Force files on Malenkov were not consulted, since I was advised that nothing of any consequence would be found there on a purely political personality such as Malenkov. The G-2 files had valuable materials and clues not duplicated in other sources.

(b) At the time I consulted these files I talked with Mr. T. A. Georgevitch of the Eurasian Branch of G-2, who is responsible for translating needed portions of the new Soviet Encyclopedia. He said that in the new Soviet Encyclopedia Malenkov would appear in about Volume 22, but only 11 volumes have so far been received in the United States; the 12th is on its way. Georgevitch also suggested that a complete search of data on Malenkov should include looking through articles and official biographic information on him which would have automatically appeared in central or provincial newspapers at the various times he was a candidate in Soviet elections. He felt that the Library of Congress would be the best overall source for Russian newspapers prior to or during World War II, but that CIA would be the best source for postwar provincial newspapers in Russia.

CIA:

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(a) OCD, OSI, OCI. On 23 January

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in charge of Intelligence Support for covert operations, and I had a conference with Mr. [redacted] and two other OCI staff members on Malenkov. We reviewed the Malenkov file which [redacted] had assembled from everything available in OCD, OSI, and OCI. [redacted] appeared to be quite knowledgeable about Soviet Politburo machinations.

The bulky folder on Malenkov contained quite a bit of both covert and overt information duplicated in the State files on Malenkov, but there were some new items on Malenkov, including a few SO reports previously unknown to me. Anyone who wishes to make a complete study of Malenkov should consult [redacted] folder; he has agreed to keep it intact and up-to-date in anticipation of further studies.

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[redacted] especially, but also the other OCI representatives, pointed out that the great majority of sources on Malenkov were secondary or tertiary and that the few primary sources which were available could not be confirmed. As a group, they thought quite highly of what [redacted] had done in his [redacted] biographic profiles of the Politburo. [redacted] said that CIA information on the Politburo, including covert sources, had been provided to [redacted] while he was searching for data.

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██████████ made the following suggestions for research re Malenkov:

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(1) That a "content" analysis be made of the speeches of Malenkov to determine trends of thought and points of emphasis. ██████████ commented that Malenkov, like so many other important Soviet leaders, employs military phraseology, e.g., "arm the workers," "let us develop weapons for industry." (If a study of this kind were to be undertaken ██████████ might be extremely useful).

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(2) To make a study of the cliques in which Malenkov has played a role from his earliest days until the present to find out which members of the cliques have disappeared and who are still closely tied to Malenkov. What characteristics were possessed by those who disappeared? By those who survived? What elements of power do the members of the Malenkov clique at present control? And what persons or forces in the Soviet Union threaten their control?

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(3) To make a similar study of the cliques around Malenkov outside Russia, especially in the Satellite areas, to see if there are any relationships which can help to explain his past or present influence or predict future developments involving him. In this connection, ██████████ said that they are at present carrying out a study of the relationships between Politburo* and Satellite leaders in an attempt to determine what predictions can be made. ██████████ pointed out that Zhdanov had at one time deliberately intervened in order to put Slansky in power in Czechoslovakia, and that now both are gone. Are there other persons tied in with Zhdanov and Slansky who might expect to be liquidated?

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(b) SR/FI Division of DDP. ██████████ 25X1A had charge of the Malenkov file for this division. The file, which I consulted on 23 January 53, consisted of 6 cards, 5 X 8 inches. In two instances the cards had information I had not previously known about.

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(c) Registry/FI/DDP. On 28 January 53, ██████████ and ██████████ of his office turned over to me for inspection some 110 references which had been pulled out of Registry and Archive files of CIA. I estimated that about 25 or 30 of these references

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* In this report the term "Politburo" is used synonymously with the present Presidium, which includes pre-19th Congress Politburo members.

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25X1A contained information not otherwise duplicated in other Malenkov files and which should be consulted for a thorough study of him. In addition to the 110 references which I screened there were, according to [REDACTED] estimate, 27 references which they had not yet been able to obtain. At any rate, all references are carefully annotated in a folder in [REDACTED] office under the responsibility of [REDACTED]

25X1A As I reviewed this material I realized that even though [REDACTED] had been given access to CIA information on Malenkov, there was much information about Malenkov which, even though seen by [REDACTED] had not been reflected in the biographic profile study on him by [REDACTED] 25X1A

Department of State: BI/LI/OIR. On 14 January I talked with Mr. R. G. Mays, Chief of the East European Branch of BI; he has charge of the Malenkov file in the Biographic Information Division of the Department of State. Comparatively speaking, Mays' folder on Malenkov is the most complete one available in those government agencies which I consulted. In addition to the folder itself there were 162 cards, 5 X 7, which contain information on Malenkov. If a quick survey of Malenkov information has to be done and limited to one source, then this would be the place to go, but it should be emphasized that there is no single file available anywhere in the government that has all the important information on him. It is interesting in this connection that no one has compiled a reasonably complete bibliography of information on Malenkov. Mays thinks that a Malenkov bibliography very much needs to be done. Mays had a number of suggestions:

25X1A (a) He said that Joe Dees of VOA in New York has often stated that there are many untapped VOA sources on the Politburo in New York. This suggestion by Mays is along the same general line as one made by [REDACTED] of CIA. Before he left for Europe in his quest for information on Soviet leaders [REDACTED] told me that in preparing for his mission he discovered that there were many good sources of information in New York, particularly among recent refugees, on Soviet leaders. [REDACTED] said that he hoped that when he completed his European mission, in about a year, he would be able to find time to pick up some of the leads he uncovered in New York. He felt that they have so far not been sufficiently exploited because the Kerensky group has monopolized the attention of those seeking information. 25X1A

(b) Mays thinks that an analysis of Malenkov's speeches and reports is a most important project which should be undertaken.*

* It is not at all unlikely that his earlier speeches reflect more of a personal and less an official production than the later speeches, which might then lead to interpretations of his personality and mental traits by means of "projective" and other remarks.

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Department of State: At the suggestion of [REDACTED] PSB liaison officer on this problem, on 8 January I conferred with Mr. [REDACTED] Chief of the Soviet Internal Branch of OIR, who had collected data on Malenkov. In addition to looking through the Malenkov material and talking with [REDACTED], I discussed Malenkov matters with [REDACTED] as well as with Mr. [REDACTED]

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Perhaps the most important item obtained from this Branch was a bibliographic listing of Malenkov's known speeches and articles supplied by [REDACTED]

A List of Malenkov's Speeches and Articles

1. "Vovlecheniye Rabochikh V Partiyu" (Enrollment of workers into the Party), Bolshevik, No. 21-22, November, 1926, p. 41.
2. "Povysheniye Proizvoditelnosti Truda I Zadachi Nizovoi Partiinoi Raboty" (Improvement of the productivity of labor and the tasks of lower Party units), Bolshevik, No. 6, March, 1929, p. 67.
3. "V Borbe Za Tempy" (In the Fight for Efficiency), Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 2, February, 1930, pp. 35-40.
4. "Report of the Mandate Commission to the XVIII All-Union Party Congress" - Bolshevik, No. 7, April, 1939, p. 91; Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 6, March, 1939, p. 61.
5. "Stalin O Bolshevistskikh Kadrakh" (Stalin About Bolshevik Cadres) - Bolshevik, No. 1, January, 1950, pp. 70-76; Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 1, January, 1940.
6. "Report to the XVIII All-Union Party Conference" (About problems of Party organizations in industry and transportation) -- Bolshevik, No. 3-4, February, 1941, pp. 11-35; Kommunisticheski Internatsional, No. 3, 1941.
7. "Speech delivered in Moscow during the 1946 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet" - Pravda, February 8, 1946, p. 2; Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, No. 3, February, 1946, p. 63.
8. "Report to the Cominform Meeting in Poland, September 1947" (About internal situation in the USSR) -- Pravda, December 9, 1947, pp. 2-3.
9. Malenkov signed the USSR Communist Party's condolences to Tokuda, General Secretary of the Japanese Communist Party. Pravda, July 21, 1948, p. 1; Soviet News (English text), July 22, 1948.

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10. "Stalin -- The Leader of Progressive Mankind" (Published in honor of Stalin's 70th birthday). Pravda, December 21, 1949, p.2; Bolshevik, No. 24, December, 1949, pp. 8-14; Soviet News, (English text), December 23, 1949, p. 6.
11. Speech delivered at the Moscow celebration of the 32nd Anniversary of the October Revolution. Pravda, November 7, 1949, pp. 2-4; Bolshevik, No. 21, November, 1949, pp. 1-17; Soviet News (English text), November 7, 1949.
12. Speech delivered in Moscow during the 1950 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet. Pravda, March 10, 1950, pp. 2-3; Soviet News (English text), March 21 and 22, 1950.
13. "Report of the Central Committee to the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party." Pravda, October 6, 1952.

Publications Consulted:

Bolshevik, 1924-52

Partiinoye Stroitelstvo, 1929-46

Partiinaya Zhizn, 1947-48

Vlast Sovetov, 1921-38

Kommunisticheski Internatsional, 1919-51

Pravda

Soviet News

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They are 13 in number, the last of which is the talk he gave before the 19th Party Congress. [redacted] pointed out that references 1, 2, 3, and 5 in this list are not well known. This list may prove useful if the suggestion made by [redacted] is carried out. It is of interest that these Malenkov speeches and articles spread from 1926 unto the present day. The earlier speeches, if they can be determined to be more or less personal products, would be especially valuable in a personality study of him.

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[redacted] said that in his opinion and in the opinion of experts on Russia, Malenkov is in first or second place as a successor. Molotov would be the only other contender.

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The Soviet Internal Branch has quite a thick folder on Malenkov. There are a few clippings in Russian and other foreign languages. Most of the data in the Soviet Internal Branch is from overt sources, among which is a dittoed copy of information on Malenkov given to Mr. Gilmore of the Associated Press on 24 October 46 by the Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau. The omissions in this outline may prove of significance.

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Remarks and Conclusions

As a result of my search of the Malenkov literature I have come to certain conclusions which I should like to jot down. These suggestions are in addition to those which have already been made by persons with whom I have talked and whose ideas have been noted in the text of this report. They will not be repeated here. Anyone interested in studying the life and influence of Malenkov should review such suggestions to determine which of them might be carried out.

(1) There is nowhere available in the government a complete file of Malenkov material. State and CIA have the bulkiest collection. There is much overlap but also significant omissions. All this material needs to be brought together.

(2) It is important to emphasize that the existing available knowledge on file on Malenkov does not warrant a detailed psychological analysis of the man. We know precious little about him. The Soviets have been complete and effective in depriving us (and their own people) from personal information about him. What were his parents like? His brothers and sisters? Or was he an only child? What did his companions have to say about him? His record at school? There are hundreds of items of information essential to a proper personality study and we have so very few answers in this case. The VOA article on Malenkov* (which, with the [REDACTED] 25X1A profile, are the two best jobs yet done on him in this country) shows how much bare speculating it is necessary to engage in to derive conclusions on which we might act. Actually, we do not have any comments from anyone who has engaged in conversation with him beyond a hello or any exchange of ordinary greetings, or who has even worked directly for or with him.** In the absence of basic primary source data there is no practical reason to encourage a team of highly specialized behavioral scientists to analyze Malenkov's personality. More primary source material needs to be collected.

* Georgi Malenkov by Lazar M. Pistrak, dt'd. 2 Oct. 52, The Research Unit and Library of the International Broadcasting Service, Dept. of State, Report #1257, Pp. 46.

** Two books have recently appeared which shed some light on his personality but the references to him in these books are sparse: My Uncle, Joseph Stalin by Budu Svanidze, published by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1952, Pp. 235; and Tito by Vladimar Dedijer published by Simon & Schuster, 1953, Pp. 436.

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(3) Even though we don't have much primary data on Malenkov, we do have at least 400 different references dealing directly or indirectly with him in government files as of January 1953. For example, in a report dated 17 October '47 from Admiral Hillenkoetter to J. Edgar Hoover, entitled "Communist International," it was stated that as early as 1945 it was known that Zhdanov and Malenkov were feuding. This important bit of information is not yet integrated into the fabric of fact and deduction about Malenkov. Two things could therefore be done:

(a) Collect and evaluate all information about Malenkov (names, dates, factual and logical inconsistencies, observations, places, rumors) and

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(b) Then prepare an outline of needed information to guide data search teams such as the [REDACTED].

(4) There needs to be developed a more unified plan for the collection, organization, and exploitation of data on important personalities. Considerable thought and planning will have to be devoted to this subject if we hope to utilize to psywar advantage information about important personages. At present we do not have a system of classifying biographical information, and intelligence officers and attaches are given very little indoctrination on this topic. I should like to see three major developments take place as soon as possible in this connection:

(a) Organize all our data on Soviet leaders so that we will have for each important person a comprehensive, detailed, well-documented biographic study. Each biographic study should devote particular attention to the friends, enemies, and acquaintances of the subject.

(b) A research project should be initiated for the development of a system for organizing and recording biographic information. Such an outline or system would prove useful to intelligence officers who need guidance in the collection of information, report writers and analysts who have to organize and make frequent use of biographic data, and psychologists and political scientists who are sometimes called upon to interpret the data for purposes of prediction. At the present time, even though all knowledge on a politically important personage were physically located in one office in a government agency, it would require an inordinate amount of time for an intelligent reader to make any sense out of the miscellaneous welter of data haphazardly, even though chronologically arranged, in a folder. Research psychologists (working with political and social scientists) should develop a comprehensive questionnaire-schema which would make it possible for a non-psychologist to

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systematically get and easily use information on persons who are politically significant to us. The schema should be so arranged that one could seek a particular type of personality information on a certain page or by means of a particular coding - for example, cross checking information about Malenkov's friends with information about Molotov's enemies.

(5) I believe that it would be useful at this time, in conjunction with psywar planning, to have a psychologist and a political scientist, both linguistically competent in Russian and with considerable knowledge of Russia and Communism, read and analyze Malenkov's speeches and publications in an attempt to determine their psychological and political content. Previous reference has been made in the text of this report to this project. It is well to bear in mind that, even though some of Malenkov's speeches and publications may be ghost written, or merely parrot the party line, they are the only tangible indices we have of his attitudes and his thinking.

(6) In analyzing the life of anyone, much light can be shed by a careful examination of the lives of persons closely associated with him. Since so little is known about Malenkov, it would be advisable to trace out the lives of persons who have either worked intimately with him or who have, in some way, clashed with Malenkov. In the case of Kaganovich, some of the questions that we might ask are: How much influence did Kaganovich really play in indoctrinating Malenkov in the '20's and in promoting him within the party? What role did Malenkov play in putting Kaganovich's sister in Stalin's bed, and was he instrumental in divorcing them later? Is he, Malenkov, as appears to be quite likely, the author of the anti-Semitic theme which Russia is now playing, and how does that fact, if it is established, relate to his teacher and mentor - Kaganovich, a Jew, and Zhdanov, who is supposed to have had many Jewish friends in the Satellites? Does Kaganovich, the early mentor of Malenkov, know too much about Malenkov so that sooner or later Kaganovich must be liquidated? To what extent was Kaganovich rather than Molotov responsible for planting Malenkov on Stalin as a personal secretary? How did Kaganovich and Malenkov get along when they worked together on the five-man World War II production and defense team? And what were the relations between Kaganovich and Zhdanov? Was Zhukov, with whom, according to Budu Svanidze, Malenkov fought on a volley ball court, in any way tied up with Zhdanov? Other than the fact that Zhdanov was competing with Malenkov for power, what personality traits did Zhdanov possess which annoyed or agitated Malenkov?

(7) My investigation of the available data on Malenkov has convinced me that there is a need in the government for a Division of

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Personality Analysis to serve intelligence and psychological operations. This division should be staffed by clinical psychologists, who have been trained and experienced in making individual biographic studies, but who have also had intelligence experience, political sophistication, and intimate personal knowledge of at least one foreign area and mastery of at least one foreign language. There has been talk about the need for this sort of thing since the end of World War II, and some progress has been made in this direction through increased attention to personality data. But a more systematic attack on this problem now seems warranted and practicable.

/s/

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